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PREFACE 
This paper has been produced as part of IlASA's hazardous waste manage- 
ment  work, which is the main component of the Institutional Settings and 
Environmental Policies project. The overall aim of this work, reflected in this 
paper, is to systematize our understanding of interactions between institu- 
tional and technical factors in policy making and implementation. The 
influence of institutional processes upon technical knowledge built into policy 
has been increasingly recognized. However, it has yet to be adequately clarified 
in comparative research on different regulatory systems. Institutional struc- 
tures canot be easily transplanted from one culture to another. Nevertheless, 
through the normal flux of policy, institutional development slowly occurs any- 
way, in more or less ad hoc fashion. Comparative insight may help to direct 
reflection and adaptation in more deliberate and constructive ways. 
This paper forms one draft chapter of an intended book on hazardous waste 
management. The reader will therefore notice references to other draft 
chapters in this study which are also being circulated separately, and which are 
available from IIASA. A full list is given overleaf. At this stage the papers are 
drafts, and are not intended for publication in present form. They are being 
circulated for review and revision. 
I would like to thank those policy makers and others who have exchanged 
papers and information with us, and those who generously gave of their time 
and experience in the  many interl:iews -.vhleh form a substential input to this 
work. A full list of acknowledgements will eventually be published. 
Brian Wynne 
Research Leader 
Institutional Settings and 
Environmental Policies 
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INTRODUCTION 
The main aim of this chapter is to identify the fundamentally different 
kinds of uncertainty in risk assessments, especially the difference between con- 
ventional technical uncertainty, and incompatible socially influenced 
definitions of the risk-generating system. This distinction is crucial, yet the 
second ldnd of uncertainty is often very subtle. Recognizing the extent of this 
second ldnd of uncertainty in the technical and institutional context of risk 
assessment, regulation and implementation has far-reaching implications. 
The following chapter three examines the conflict between the need, on the 
one hand, for stacdardized technical formulae and methods in risk assessment 
and regulation, and the contradictory logic of tailoring risk assessment and 
regulatory controls to risks arising in real situations in all their diversity and 
instability. This conflict in technical frameworks straddles a deeper institu- 
tional conflict as to where to allocate responsibility and power to interpret 
regulatory aims. I t  parallels the disparity which exists between central policy 
formulation of regulatory rules, standards, etc.. and the often very different 
informal realities of their diverse local implementation, when other influences 
and logics come into play. 
This chapter develops these questions through several examples, and 
shows how they are  connected, for example in the ways in which genuine situa- 
tional risk-variation overlaps with and often looks identical to  varying percep- 
tions of the  same risk-situation or process. 
Perceptual differences are often treated as  ra ther  exotic matters  of public 
"irrationalities" only, having little to do with technical realities and discrimina- 
tions. The present analysis concludes to the  contrary, that  perceptual 
differences of what a technology is, what are its significant components and 
connections (in detail and in the large) influence experts and their rigorous 
technical risk assessments also. Yet this influence is usually unrecognized, 
and conflicting analyses attributed instead merely to un-closed technical 
imprecisions and uncertainties. 
These assumptions or perceptual commitments underlying technical 
analysis for regulation are part of a tissue of informal judgments in science 
which ultimately cannot be justified by tight, unambiguous rules of inference, 
method or logic. This 'informalist' model is sometimes regarded as criticism of 
science: in fact i t  is a tribute to  its flexibility and resilience. Yet the  opposite 
model dominates public attitudes, and policy m a k n g  institutions [I.]. As 
zmphasized in this Chapter, the pervasiveness of this intrinsic, informal dirnen- 
sion of science complicates the requirements of formal accountability and 
standardization for authoritative regulation. This is  especially t rue where the  
real world character of the issue is so ill-defined and extremely variable, and 
where public skepticism and more elaborate justification - especially on siting 
and transport -is increasingly being demanded of regulation [Z] .  
The impossibility of objective definition of risk problems and of assessment 
or regulation decision-rules is stressed in this Chapter. However, the aim is not 
to suggest that formal risk assessment should not be pursued, but to lay bare 
the extreme fragility of the authority of such decision processes to public s k e p  
ticism, if this begins to assert itself. This inherent vulnerability is multiplied 
by the large unknowns and indeterminate, ill-defined nature of the policy field 
in the hazardous waste case, properties which undermine attempts to discrim- 
inate and even rank with scientific precision the risks associated with different 
regulatory options. In these circumstances, administrative cultures and insti- 
tutional arrangements which fragment the overall process of risk management 
and regulation are more likely to find their policy implementation picked apart 
and undermined or paralyzed due to the interacting uncertainties, complexi- 
ties and conflicts involved, than systems which manage to coalesce and absorb 
the different phases into more unitary institutional forms. 
Although the immediate problems facing policy makers have been about 
the establishment of an effective industrial treatment and disposal (T & D) 
infrastructure, this focus has been complicated by the increasing need - aris- 
ing out of growing public concern - to address the risk management issue 
more explicitly and systematically. Thus a circular obstacle has tended to con- 
found attempts to develop the appropriate infrastructure. 
Due to basic ignorance, the particular configuration of wastes and thus 
risks is badly defined, and cannot be better defined anti1 a better knowiedge of 
waste arisings, properties and specific environmental dispositions is gained. An 
industrial T & D infrastructure needs to be developed to control these waste 
arisings now, but may require adaptation and thus possibly costly abandonment 
or changes of large investments when risk-estimates are revised. However, 
whatever regulations are established will directly affect public acceptability of 
those plants, and the  size of their markets, thus their viability in two dimen- 
sions. Hence there is a very great reluctance on the part of private industry to 
take initiatives or be involved in the  T & D field. Thus the  interaction between 
"industrial innovation" and Risk hsessment  (RA) definitions is strong, and not 
necessarily free of contradictions. 
Risk assessment requires reliable estimates of the toxicity or hazard causd 
by exposure to a given waste, and estimates of the chance of exposure. This is a 
combination of intrinsic material properties and situational variations - how it 
is packaged, mixed, treated, confined, etc. Unfortunately, physical. chemical 
and behavioural heterogeneity, and unpredictable behavioural freedom in the 
system, mean that  "downstream" unpredictables may swallow up putative risk- 
differentials. 
Yet however underripe the field may be for it, a RA management framework 
seems inevitable. It is therefore necessary to explore what the possibilities and 
implications are for using formal risk assessment approaches to hazardous 
waste management. There is currently a lively debate amongst policy makers 
as  to  how elaborate RA can and should be for hazardous waste management. 
Even in the United Kingdom, the  traditional stronghold of non-quantified, 
informal methods of decision making on issues involving risks, a recent Royal 
Society Study Group and the Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution 
both expressed strong support for more quantification of'risk assessments [3]. 
Not only in the  US therefore but also in Europe there is already, and will con- 
tinue to be, growing pressure to adopt formal RA methods in hazardous waste 
management. This chapter will therefore review the  possibilities and limita- 
tions of present risk assessment methods applied to hazardous waste manage- 
ment. 
An initial question is whether formal RA should apply a t  a central policy 
level where decisions may be more discrete 'events' (such as whether to 
develop local or regionalized facilities), or a t  more routine but perhaps equally 
significant levels of regulatory implementation (such as siting or licensing con- 
ditions of given facilities; design of particular processes, including containment 
devices; or trigger standards filtering hfferent materials into different levels of 
regulation and different levels of treatment and disposal). Once, one could say 
that  the former may have involved justification as well as internal technical 
analysis, whilst the latter were purely technical, with no symbolic justificatory 
dimension. Nowadays, even these tend to require justification as external scru- 
tiny and scepticism advance. This changes the role of Rk 
The US Office of Technology Assessment Report reflects a typical view, of 
"technical optimism", that  formal hazardous waste RA should produce hazard 
classiflcations ranking degrees of hazard and indicating appropriate T & D 
routes [4]. Being based on the same scientific knowledge, thus would presum- 
ably generate consistency amongst definitions and classifications. Yet as 
chapters 3 and 4 show as well as this chapter. "scientific" definitions of hazard 
are ambiguous: they are not merely physically uncertain, but actively incor- 
porate different social assumptions reflecting different, and even incompatible 
administrative purposes commitments and needs in different systems. Chapter 
4 describes in detail some of the origins of such different mixes of "science" 
(including uncertainty) and other factors in different hazard classification 
schemes. As we shall see in this chcpter, risk assessments, even for relatively 
uniform, well defined technologies let alone hazardous chemical wastes, have 
suffered large intrinsic uncertainty and inconsistencies due to implicit 
differences in the assumptions structuring technical analysis. 
DEFINING RISK 
The conventional definition of risk is the  product of the degree of h a r m  a 
given event  would cause, and the  probability of tha t  event's occurring, 
This would express a risk as, say estimated number of attributable deaths or  
other  damage per  un i t  t ime of operation of a given activity. But, say, a chemi- 
cal plant might accidentally emit  lethal clouds of toxic gases every year in a 
remote region, and cause zero harm. O r  a given chemical waste may be 
extremely toxic, and thus  in principle of high hazard, but  environmentally 
highly immobile and  remote, therefore of low risk. Hazard may therefore 
describe the  intrinsic "worst-case" damage a process or material  could cause 
whilst t he  above definition of risk incorporates variable situational 
qualifications which reduce the probability of this  worst case damage [5]. 
In t h e  case of industrial plant, some such qualifications a re  that:  properly 
designed, constructed and operated equipment has a low chance of failure; 
many parts of processes have reserve parts  in  case of failure; have fail-safe or  
redundancy built in to  the  system; and have monitoring systems which 
automatically reac t  t o  early signals so as  to  prevent major failures. Other fac- 
tors  affecting P might be tha t  operating staff a r e  of greater  or lesser profes- 
sional expertise, t ha t  regulation and inspection is lax or tight, t ha t  there is 
g rea te r  or  lesser pressure economically to  c u t  corners,  t ha t  there  is more or  
less design, construction and operating experience, remote siting, e tc .  etc.  
In the case of hazardous chemicals, some equivalent qualifying factors 
might  be t h e  physical form of a chemical, (e.g., if i t  is an  inhalation danger, is 
i t  i n  Ane powder form?); chemical s ta te  (e.g., i s  i t  in a soluble compound 
valency s tate)  and  form of containment; volume; local disposition (is i t  accessi- 
ble t o  environmental pathways back to  human populations); s t a t e  of mixing 
with other  materials; the  kind of human handling it receives, etc. ,  e tc .  
A typical schematic form of Risk function would be as  in figure 2. 
" ze ro - i  n f  i n i t y "  
r i s k s  
1 1 
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1 c2 Consequences, C (e.g . , deaths/ t imel  
FIGURE 1. A Typical risk-function (schematic). 
The same Risk, R on this formulation, can be given by different combina- 
tions of P and C, for example, PICl = PZCZ, but these may represent radically 
different .events and experiences. Thus a compelling criticism of the  R = PC 
formulation has  been tha t  the universal dimensions thus produced. take n o  
account  whatever of other,  perhaps major differences in the kinds of damage 
under  consideration - i t  does not a t  all compare like with like. "Risk" as  con- 
ventionally defined is thus an artificially narrowed concept which may  or  may 
not  capture the  essential features of an issue o r  decision problem which i ts  
different participants define. 
A related difficulty of compound risk approaches is tha t  they may conceal 
value commitments  in their definition. Thus risk expressed as product,  &C. 
may incorporate different kinds of harm - mortality, morbidity, other losses - 
without specifying these, and be measured implicitly against different yardst- 
icks. Thus a comparison of risks per uni t  t ime may be very different from a 
comparison of t he  same risks per unit of output  (or capital or labor input) if 
one process is more productive than another  in te rms of t ime, capital or  labor. 
A work-force may wish to know risks per unit  of work time; a manager per capi- 
tal input or output; and  a local resident, per unit  of residence time. These 
often implicit yardsticks can suddenly change the apparent scale and impor- 
tance of risks very considerably [ 6 ] .  
Another problem with the  conventional approach has been tha t  the proba- 
bility of a given harm actually occurring usually depends upon a compound of 
probabilities: (i) of a s e t  of necessary, or facilitating sub-events occurring; (ii) 
in a complex plant or  with hazardous materials the  same damage could be 
created by many different possible accident sequences. involving different 
chains of events in different components. Thus even in the  same plant or sys- 
tem, the same "risk" may be posed by different sequences and combinations. 
In other words, the use of the  formula R = PxC may often conceal more 
than it illuminates, for one thing because i t  may confuse different routes to the  
same risk end-point; and secondly because i t  may conceal different assumed 
end points which should be carefully distinguished. Thus for example a highly 
hazardous facility may be recorded as a low risk facility because i t  is remotely 
sited, when i t  is the .remote siting which is low risk, no t  the  facility. 
In any reai anaiysis, the  P of a given end poifit. C is actually the integral of 
products of probabilities P, of each set  of sub-events which could end up in C. 
If one includes external doses and health damages a s  end points (rather  than, 
say, releases from a plant) the  network of events and chains proliferates. Given 
tha t  risk analysis is supposed to be a policy decision aid, there is a trade off to  
be made between (i) decomposition of risk calculations, which can show sensi- 
tive points (either of ignorance or failure probability) in the overall risk sys- 
tem, but which may not  give policy actors end points which are  meaningful to 
their decision language; or  (ii) composite risk terms which have the opposite 
pros and cons. 
In the light of these problems, other experts therefore advocate that  the  
term risk be used to define only the probability of occurrence of a specif ied 
end-point  or harmful event [7], so as to clarify the distinctions between (possi-' 
bly multiple) intrinsic hazards of any material or activity, and qualifying fac- 
tors such as siting, containment,  operating rules, t reatment ,  etc., which reduce 
the probability of a given hazard's being realized in practice. 
We can therefore distinguish between what might be called the "fundamen- 
talist" approach (in tha t  it a t tempts to distinguish between "fundamental" 
hazard characteristics which i t  is supposed are invariant), and a situational 
approach which recognizes variations according to different physical situations, 
chemical forms, environmental conditions and human actions and decisions. 
This distinction is analyzed in Chapter Three. 
Situational discrimination seems to represent an  overall improvement in 
clarity of risk definition, but i t  should be noted that  the  distinctions are not  
absolute. For example if a chemical waste is treated (deliberately or  not) thus 
reducing its hazardousness by making i t  say less soluble therefore less environ- 
mentally mobile (as  well as less gut-ingestible), is this an in tr ins ic  change or a 
situational one (especially if it is a reve-sible change)? Containment or back- 
up devices for nuclear reactors or other hazardous installation . m a y  be 
regarded as 'intrinsic' parts of plant design in some countries, but optional 
extras, thus 'situational' elsewhere [a]. There is no clear-cut 'natural' s tate  of 
a material or technology by which to define its intrinsic hazards and which 
could act as a definitive base for explicating all situational risk-qualifiers. We 
return to this point later. Nevertheless, with this concept in mind the distinc- 
tion may still be a valid methodological principle, and an improvement over 
compound Risk terms. 
Formal, quantified risk assessment was first developed in military and 
nuclear systems especially in engineering reliability for design and construc- 
tion standards. Although the human components in such systems have 
recently received increased attention, the approach was dominated by proba- 
bilistic estimation of failure rates in mechanical components. More recently 
however, this engineering strand has been complemented by developing biologi- 
cal approaches to analyzing the hazards of released materials either from large 
accidental discharges following such mechanical failures or from routine emis- 
sions [9]. 
As is discussed below, even risk analysis of relatively standard technologies 
such as liquid energy gas terminal facilities or nuclear power station, suffer 
colossal differences according to different implicit process and problem- 
definitions and underlying assumptions. 
DEFINING THE RISK GENERATING PROCESS 
Formal probabilistic risk assessment of complex. potentially hazardous 
systems examines component reliability and the knock-on effects of failure 
through a causal chain in the system to some harmful consequence. Thus 
"fault tree" analysis begins with a hyp~thesized failure a t  some chosen point, 
then identifies the possible branching sequences, attaching an estimated proba- 
bility to each sequence aiming at a composite estimated probability of 
occurrence for a range of harmful consequences. A sister-technique, event 
tree analysis s tar ts  the other way about, analyzing the various possible chains 
of events in the system tha t  could lead to  a given end  point, then estimating 
the  probabilities of each linking failure, leading to  overall probabilities for each 
identified harmful end  point. 
Various controversies around such risk analyses, notably tha t  over the US 
Rasmussen Nuclear Reactor safety analysis [ lo] ,  have shown how deep a re  the  
uncertaint ies  and opportunities for  choice a t  almost every s tep  in such ana- 
lyses: 
(i) there  a r e  many different potential release-events from a given plant, 
each of which has to  be analyzed for i t s  estimated work-force and 
external consequences. In order  to  reduce the  consequence- 
estimation to  feasible scale these a r e  usually grouped into a smaller 
number of families. For example 14 failure or release categories were 
used in the Rasmussen Study, as  t he  inputs to analyses of external 
consequences. 
(ii) each release event end point usually has  many, possibly interacting 
chains of possible failures t ha t  can  lead to  t he  same end-point. There 
is no guarantee tha t  all possible significant release end-points or 
other  pathways increasing the  probability of even a known end point, 
have been identified. 
(iii) even before composite probabilities a r e  estimated, t he  description of 
possible chains of events is in itself so complicated tha t  there  is room 
even after a real event  such a s  the Three Mile Island accident, for 
dispute as to whether or not the real world event sequence was actu- 
ally described in the preceding analysis [ll]. 
(iv) the  basis of probability est imates  of component failures and cascading 
sequences of events is highly variable. In some cases good empirical 
experience exists for reasonable statistical extrapolation; in others 
the applicability of historical data is questionable (e.g.. samples of 
boiler failures - can data on conventional steam boilers of smaller 
size. thicker or thinner metal etc. apply to nuclear pressure vessels?); 
in others theoretical estimation has to suffice but may be incapable of 
experimental validation; in yet others, sheer ignorance prevails and 
either expert subjective judgments have to be orchestrated using 
Bayesian statistical methods [12], or crude guesses a re  made. 
(v) normally, such uncertainties could be expressed as confidence limits 
or error bars around each component probability. But just as  the pro- 
babilities (if independent) multiply through the analysis, so do the 
uncertainties surrounding each figure. Furthermore, in many real 
cases, the  specific events considered do not have independent proba- 
bilities. This so-called "common-mode" [13] escalation of normal 
failure probabilities is especially prominent where human actors are 
more influential in the  system. Legitimately different implicit judge- 
ments about these have large effects on analytical outcomes. This 
factor has not been widely recognized until recently. 
Dimensions of Uncertainty - Ignorance and Perception 
There are several basically different sources of conflict or uncertainty in 
such risk analyses. These are often confused. There is of course the  possibility 
that  one analyst or another has simply been less careful or competent than 
another. More important however, are rhose  apparent!^ frequent cases when 
equally competent analysts reach vastly different conclusions as t o  the risks 
from ostensibly the same process or system. Sometimes this is attributable to  
very different but equally plausible (or implausible) guesses as to  component 
behavior or process connections about which little or no knowledge exists. This 
would create different risk estimates even if precisely the  same process or sys- 
tem were being defined. J3u.t consider the case in which the  estimated probabil- 
ity of one link in an event-chain leading to an accident is infinitesimally small 
in one analysis, and significant in another.  In the  la t te r  case i t  may become 
the critical path to an accident, in the former i t  may be placed amongst those 
conceptually possible pathways tha t  are regarded as  virtually negligible. Notice 
now that  strictly speaking, each different analysis may described a dinerent  
detailed risk-process as the  one leading to the most significant risks. 
This point may be generalized, because in many real cases ignorance about 
causal events such as: hydrodynamics in complex pipe-work under extreme 
conditions; human behavior affecting risk-pathways; materials failure under 
very specific. often extreme conditions; and thus  of pathways to subsequent 
releases, is overwhelming. Assumptions by analysts therefore about the  boun- 
dary of the  technology or process under  analysis, and also about i ts internal 
s t ructure,  may be legitimately very variable. There is a continuum from sys- 
tems where the different choices between analysts may be very narrow, detailed 
and technical (though still highly significant) t o  systems where the differences 
may include implicit behavioral judgments, large-scale differences over 
system-boundaries, internal cause-effect s t ructures ,  etc. Whether broad o r  
detailed, these differences of system- or  problem-definition may be determined 
by social positions of analysts r a the r  than freely chosen. 
LEG Facility Risks 
I will give some examples ranging from narrow to broad differences: The 
IIASA study of the risk analyses produced during the  four different national sit- 
ing decisions for LEG terminal facilities can be used a s  an  example of narrow 
differences [14]. In all there  were fifteen different risk analyses, but although 
t he  technology and process analyzed was very similar in all four cases,. they  
reached very varied conclusions. In part ,  this was due to different analytical 
definitions of what is meant  by risk - what kind of potential cost? Given tha t  
such definitions vary according to  social positions and values, i t  is not surpris- 
ing tha t  t he  initial, often unreflective process of narrowing down the  analytical 
'problem' to  one kind of cost out of the  wide choice in principle available (e.g.. 
population-risk, critical group; per day, per tonne of gas, per job provided, etc.), 
produced sometimes incompatible s t a r t i n g  points, let alone finishing points. 
However there were deeper problem and uncertainties than this. 
As Mandl and Lathrop note [15]: 
... several decisions must  be made in the  course of performing a risk 
assessment,  such as  how to characterize risk, what presentation for- 
ma t s  to  use, what gaps to fill with assumptions, what assumptions to 
adopt, which of several conflicting models to use, how to indicate the 
degree of confidence of the results,  and which events simply to omit 
from the  analysis. These decisions can push the  results in any direc- 
tion ... 
Thus for example, some studies included shipping collisions or grounding 
and  spills, others focused only on storage tank rupture,  others included 
t ransfer  spills, none analyzed poLentia1 sabotage. Even on specific events, esti- 
ma te s  varied without any explanation. One study assumed tha t  for a typical 
layout of six tanks surrounded by dikes, a valid estimate for a credible spill size 
was 15% of t h e  contents of one tank, whilst others  took a t  least the full contents 
of one t ank  as  a conservative estimate.  The est imated probability of a spill a t  
one site varied by a factor of lo3 to in three separate analyses. 
When the analysis is extended to cover e f f e c t s  of a release, the conflicting 
assumptions multiply. Different models of dispersion and ignition were used, 
The major difference was that three facilitjes were for liquefied natural gas, methane, 
which requires very low temperatures (-161.5"c), the other was for liquefied petroleum gas, 
mainly propane and butane, which are less vo!ati!e and can be stored at  nearly ambient 
temperature and pressare. In fact this technical difference was dominated by other 
differences introduced by the analysts in the studies. 
different causes of damage were assumed - some took secondary blast effects 
to be the sole cause of deaths while others took thermal radiation. 
It may be initially tempting to say that analysts chose their  detailed 
problem-definition to suit the  conclusion they wanted; but not all such assump- 
tions have identifiable effects on the conclusion, and one must  also accept tha t  
some of the  shaping of problem-definition is unconscious and determined by 
social positions, specific intellectual traditions to which analysts belong, etc. 
This has been widely found to occur in science generally [16]. 
As Mandl and Lathrop conclude [17], 
... what is striking about the estimates is the magnitude of the  
differences. Societal risk, individual risk, and the risk of one or more 
fatalities vary over four orders of magnitude across sites, and the  risk 
of ten or more fatalities varies over eight orders of magnitude across 
sites. It is hard to imagine another area of political concern where 
performance measures receiving as much attention as these did could 
vary over such a wide range. Yet even more striking are  the  
differences between the three reports prepared for Point Conception. 
There is about a factor of ten  difference in both societal and individual 
risk .... There is a difference of four orders of magnitude in the  risk of 
ten or more fatalities. A policy maker faced with such variations 
could conclude that all three reports are based on very limited 
knowledge of the risks of LEG. 
furthermore, 
.... Each report poses a s  a representation of the current  s tate  of 
howledge regarding LEG risks, but because that knowledge is incom- 
plete, some of the reports represent it using probabilistic terms or 
error bounds. Yet each report is based on a different state of 
howledge: different assumptions are made, models used, probabili- 
ties estimated, etc. No one report in fact represents a comprehensive 
representation of the current  state of knowledge. When SAI gives a 
probability of 9.9~10". and FERC gives a probability of 8.1x10-~, for 
the  same event, the policy maker is likely to be somewhat a t  a loss as 
to the appropriate figure upo!~ which to base his 01. her decisions. 
... each represents only a subset of the total state of know-ledge. Yet 
neither report acknowledges tha t  the  other estimate exists! ... 
The implication, not fully spelled out, is that formal risk assessments may 
be unreflectively pretending to contain ignorance and "uncertainty" within 
apparently probabilistic bounds, which then appear to be analytically 
manageable, therefore definable as  'risk,' [18]: whereas the  real scale of uncer- 
tainty is more properly characterized by (i) ignorance (there a re  factors and 
combinations that  are just n o t  even identified, let  alone 'estimable'), and (ii) 
such a wide scope of legitimate analytical choice in defining the relevant sys- 
t em structure that  the  resulting knowledge is not  characterized only by 'pas- 
sive' uncertainty, t ha t  due to  the  effects of imprecisely known quant i t ies ,  but  
also by 'actively' shaped uncertainty (and certainty -five studies did not even 
mention uncertainties!) This land of uncertainty, although usually perceived as 
the 'imprecision' kind, is actually impl ic i t  conflict. It may or may not  be redu- 
cible by negotiat ion between the  analysts, but it will not be resolvable by more 
precise observation or analysis which is the  usual fallacy. The conflict is due to  
the effects of impl ic i t  analyt ical  choices e v e n  in defining what  the 'technology' 
is. When technology is viewed a s  i t  should be, as a social-organizational entity 
(embodying 'hardware' bu t  also behavioral relationships), this point can be 
more clearly seen [19]. 
Prom Technical Imprecision to Social Contradiction 
Cox has given a useful discussion of unrecognized uncertainties underlying 
r isk assessments, caused by variation in the  actual processes being evaluated, 
when fixed processes a r e  being assumed in t h e  risk analysis [20]. 
In order t o  simplify his example Cox takes the evaluation of only work- 
force risks, thus excluding for now the further domain of problems of external 
emissicns and associated risks. Although he discusses risks of electricity pro- 
duction technologies, t he  point applies to  all technological process. Following 
is an outline of his argument: 
Modern analysis can define technology as  a network of stages connected by 
input-output flows. A given stage is defined by its input-output s t ructure.  For 
example: stages of mining, smelting, refining, manufacturing and finishing in a 
typical metallurgical industry; waste arising, in-plant mixing o r  t rea tment ,  
'packaging,' transport,  storage, possible transfer and fur ther  mixing, final 
t rea tment  and  disposal, in the case of hazardous waste. More detailed models 
can be made of single plants. 
The occupational risk per overall unit  of output associated with a s e t  of 
stages,  J in the  process, is 
where the  s e t  of states,  J, is  defined a s  a technology (say, incineration) which is 
assumed to  be well-defined. with a constant  input-output s t ructure;  Qj is  t h e  
number  of units of output from stage j per  year;  Lj is t he  number of man-hours  
of labor used in the  production of one uni t  of output from stage j ;  r j  is t h e  
number  of deaths per employee-hour in stage j ;  and a, is the fraction of t h e  
annual output  from stage j (e.g., x tonnes of enriched uranium from fuel repro- 
cessing) needed to  support whatever overall production unit is used as risk 
yardstick (e.g., per 1 GWe of electricity produced or consumed). 
Conventional risk assessment uncertain t ies arise, and multiply in t he  mul-  
t i l inear combination of values, each of which is a product of other uncertain 
est imates  and  data. and so on. However, there a r e  more basic uncertainties in  
defining the  'system,' 'process,' or 'technology' in the first place. For example 
every process has to be an open system, with inputs from and outputs t o  an  out- 
side environment. Therefore a process or  technolcgy has to  be d e f i ~ e d  by plac- 
in.g l imits on it, thereby also defining its environment: but then  arises t h e  
thorny question of appropri.ate system o r  problem boundary, or - p u t  another  
way -attribution of risk responsibility: 
Should nuclear reactor risk assessment include the risks of reprocessing, 
transport, waste dsposal,  even possibly horizontal nuclear weapons prolifera- 
tion since these are arguably associated with it as inevitable entailments? 
Should the risk assessment of fluorine contaminated hazardous waste from 
aluminum smelting incorporate an element of the risks of coal mining or 
nuclear risks because of the intensive use of electricity in aluminum produc- 
tion? Does one include in coal risks, the risks involved in the manufacture of, 
say, the  trucks found a t  mine heads, even though the same trucks would have 
been made had there never been such a coal mine? Once begun, the  possibili- 
ties of such connections are limitless and paralyzing. 
~nhaber ' s  use [23.] of essentially the  same approach to analyzing energy 
system risks for example found high total risks for wind and solar power. But 
closer examination showed that  these high risks resulted from an arbitrary 
assumption that dirty coal would be used as back up for these (intermittent) 
technologies used as base-load supply systems. Thus Inhaber's definition of 
'solar technology' included dirty coal technology too! A normal definition of 
solar and wind technologies has them organized with storage systems, or  with 
clean back-up. This is a different definition of the technology as  a 
social-organizational unit. 
A s  Cox emphasizes, the real economy and real technologies are far less 
simple than that implied in fixed internal structures of technologies, processes 
or even industries, and thus Axed technological coefficients. Both the boun- 
daries and interns1 structure of a technology can (a) vary in the real world. a ~ d  
(b) be defined variably by the risk analyst (and others) as "the" technology or 
"the" risk problem in question. I t  is important to note that these are  uncer- 
tainties in risk analysis over and above, and quali tat ively different from, those 
associated with imprecise measurement in analysis. I t  is suggested that  they 
are  also key unrecognized variables in the strong dislocations of risk percep- 
tions between different 'experts' and different public groups which is now a 
major concern in policy making. 
Another se t  of examples enlarging the  same point come from scientific 
disputes o i e r  the environmental risks of the proposed MacKenzie Valley pipe- 
line from Arctic Canada to  the  USA [22]. Implicit, and eventually revealed, in 
the analyst's conflicting scientific conclusions were different social-behavioral 
judgments which created different problem-definitions. Thus some scientists 
assumed tha t  one pipeline could realistically be evaluated for i ts  effects in  iso- 
lation from further  pipelines, roads, telegraph lines, airfields, residential 
service-towns and other  developments (the "corridor") which o ther  scientists 
assumed would inevitably follow. and  which should therefore, they believed be a 
'natural' par t  of the system to  be evaluated. 
In another  part  of the  same dispute, the  damage to tundra from construc- 
tion work was assumed by some analysts to be limited to tha t  within o f i c ia l  lim- 
itations of construction to  winter months, when the tundra was hard-frozen. 
Other analysts assumed this was unrealistic because they believed the  pressure 
of deadlines and huge investments would inevitably cause these limitations to  
be broken in practice, with summer-season construction leading to far greater  
damage. 
Nuclear  Technology 
In these cases, as before, lnere  is no objeclive, sinzular problem-deiinition 
or technological system which can be more and more precisely "revealed." A 
further  example showing a slightly different but essentially similar dimension 
arose in the  Wiadscale lnquiry in 1977 into a. proposed oxide nuclear fuel repro- 
cessing plant [23]. The inquiry chairman,  the nuclear industry and government 
agencies defined the  risk assessment  decision as  t h a t  concerning a single 
reprocessing plant, and nothing more. Objectors on the other  hand, assumed 
tha t  the  plant, which generated plutonium and uranium for fur ther  rounds of 
nuclear  power systems, would c rea te  institutional momentum for more nuclear 
developments including widespread fast  breeder reactors  and plutonium com- 
merce. The risk assessment question, and the associated technological system, 
was deflned a s  much larger  and  more diffuse, and was dismissed as "emotive" 
nonsense by the chairman. 
Here was a conflicting choice of technology- or problem-definition which 
was not a 'facts' versus 'emotions' division. Nor was i t  clearly perceived and 
debated in the Inquiry a s  a conflict of founding problem-definitions. Yet t h e  
conflicting, equally legitimate definitions were a symmetrical pair based upon 
the  different behavioral judgments and objective social experiences of the  con- 
tending groups. To members  of the  establishment, i t  was rational t o  draw a 
boundary round t h e  present  plant, because they could objectively expect t o  
influence and identify with the  subsequent decisions whether or not to make 
fur ther  commitments. These decisions, and the technologies involved, could be 
logically fenced off and neglec ted  For outsiders to t h e  decision making estab- 
l ishment however, an  incompatible, but equally objective logic prevailed. From 
the i r  objective social position, with their  social experience, i t  was rational to  
assume tha t  they would have no  real par t  in any of those subsequent decisions, 
a s  they  had been excluded in t he  past. It was therefore rational to condense all 
~ o s s i b l e  foreseeable future developments onto t h e  present single plant deci- 
sion. The technology or  risk-syst.em was thus  defined to take these extensive 
fur ther  probabilities into account.  
The important point is t ha t  each position, 'expert'  or otherwise, was based 
upon behavioral judgments and social experiences which were ~ lecessary  t o  
frame a problem a t  all. But each was equally defensible, or illogical, according 
to one's social position. No deeper, more objective definition of ' the technol- 
ogy' existed. Nevertheless, the language of the  Inquiry was totally tha t  of an 
'objective' technology with 'objective' effects, which could be 'discovered'  
through t h e  conflict by more rigorous analysis. 
One structural  variable which has become increasingly prominent even in 
highly automated technologies is the  role of "the human factor" in bringing 
about accidents. To the extent  t ha t  this  has been systematically examined a t  
all, i t  tends to have taken a mechanical, individual operator emphasis, attempt- 
ing to draw upon empirical experience of "failure rates" for probabilistic extra- 
polation. Organizational distractions, and  dislocations brought about by collec- 
tively induced "mind-sets" have been less fully integrated into risk analysis 
[241. 
Pesticides 
Again in this general case, t he  institutional origins of the  risk analysis 
influence the  definition of the  ' s t ructure '  of the  technology, which is neverthe- 
less presented as  if fixed, natural ,  and 'objective.' "Expertise" in defining "the" 
system may be open to surprisingly wide dispute. For example, the official 
government scientific Advisory Committee on the  Safety of Pesticides (PAC) in 
the UK, evaluated the  risks associated with 2,4,5-T in the  late 1970s, when pub- 
lic suggestions about i ts pervasive h a r m  were accumulating [25]. Having 
analyzed the  scientific evidence, t he  Carnrnittee d~ c:eed tha t  2.4,5-T could ccn- 
t inue in its widespread use. After at tempts  to  reopen the issue by t h e  National 
Union of Agricultural and Allied Workers, the main labor union involved in 
spraying 2,4,5-T for farm and other  employers (including many local authorities 
and government agencies such as  British Rail), the PAC reasserted the safety of 
2.4,5-T, dismissing the  large NUAAW dossier of admittedly circumstantial clini- 
cal and other evidence of actual harm, as  unscientific. 
This rather  patronizing scientific rebuttal only polarized the gathering 
conflict even more, and eventually, in the face of further Union action, the  PAC 
advanced the explicit qualification tha t  i ts  assertion of the  safety of 2,4,5-T was 
conditional upon its proper manufacture, distribution and use. These condi- 
tions were precisely where the farm workers' and others' direct experience and 
evidence was focused. In this behavioral reality of t he  technology of 2,4,5-T pro- 
duction and use, they were the experts and not the  PAC scientists. This 
'behavioral' reality was not m e r e l y  social, it was also physical - i t  shaped the  
actual physical processes that  led to real damage. The laboratory controlled 
tes t s  in the  scientific l i terature examined by the  PAC produced Risk Assess- 
ments  which excluded a priori the realities of distribution and use of 2,4,5-T, 
and  which potentially radically altered its risks. Furthermore, these were 
behavioral or institutional conditions - "the human factor" - jus t  as  objective 
a s  many physical parameters included. For example drums of 2,4.5-T often 
arrive with defaced or  removed labels supposed to describe proper conditions of 
use. Even if these are lmown, the  organizational realities of farm life often do 
not  allow a farm worker to refuse to spray just because the climate is not 
correct,  or  because specified protective equipment is defective or non-existent. 
Also, the  cultural reality of such work life does not encourage a man to say he  
is concerned about the possible risks of such materials. 
The point of this example Is to  d~rnons t r e t e  again the analytical options 
available in specifying the  process or technology for risk assessment. The nar- 
row, unrealistic technical definition in this case produced arguably false risk 
assessments, arid corresponding social and technical dislocations which have 
ramified beyond the  specific issue in question into general issues of regulatory 
credibility, even good faith. 
Below, we explore this perspective further since i t  produces additional 
important questions about the kinds of uncertainty underlying formal risk 
assessment and policy management. 
To summarize the  present section, different socially influenced structural  
definitions of a 'technology' or 'technological system' [including its i m p l e m e n -  
tation] form taken for granted but different problem-definitions underlying for- 
mal, rigorous risk analysis. There is no  single objective definition of a technol- 
ogy which supercedes all others. Risk analysts have to make commitments to  
one definition or  another, before  analysis begins. These commitments may 
differ. This point has been addressed a t  length, because i t  clarifies a key confu- 
sion frequently found between two quite different types of uncertainty in risk 
analysis: 
Type 1 is the  most commonly recognized, for example in the estimation of 
the probability of a given event, say a key component failure, which combined 
with other events may lead to human ha rm or other  unacceptable end-points. 
There may be (is always) uncertainty about such factors because they are 
genuinely indeterminate, or  because although determinate,  we have inadequate 
knowledge for accurate  estimation; or  due to  complex mixtures of both. For all 
i ts inscrutability or  a t  best, partial scrutability, one can  a t  least say tha t  this 
type 1 uncertainty is 'there,'  in the  system. 
All this usually generates uncertainty enough. However type 2 uncertainty 
intermingles with type 1, but is fundamentaily differel~t. It is that  induced by 
different perceptions, different definitions even of the  risk problem. But these 
may be so subtle or socially ingrained a s  to be unrecognized as  such by t h e  
analyst, even when they are extreme [as in the 2,4.5-T case]. These are 
actively, though often sub-consciously c r e a t e d  uncertainties built into t h e  very 
structure of the analytical domain, and influenced by institutional factors, such 
as the  analyst's social and professional background, institutional position in a 
decision making network, etc. This type of difference can give rise to different 
estimations of the same factor, therefore to recognized bands of type 1 uncer- 
tainty. But it does not stop there. Institutional uncertainty e n v e l o p s  the sys- 
t e m  rather  than merely resides within it, because "the system" or "the starting 
problem" is itself subject to  conflicting definitions. This uncertainty is not in 
the definitions, but all around them. This may have radical implications for 
poticy and risk assessment. 
UNCERTAINTY BY SIRATEGIC DESIGN 
In the  previous part of this chapter we have distinguished in technical risk 
assessment between 'orthodox' imprecision, type 1 (which may include real sys- 
t em indeterminacy), and structural,  or institutional uncertainty, type 2, 
brought about by (frequently subtle) differences and tacit  conflicts of problem- 
definition. 
In this section we will examine different kinds of uncertainty underlying 
the at tempt to define terms and data which are normally regarded as  absolutely 
central to a regulatory scheme. We will progress from 'orthodox' uncertainties 
in measuring hazardous waste forms, to  active socially generated uncertainties 
in measuring hazardous waste forms, to  active socially generated uncertainties 
in even defining hazardous wastes. The point will be to  show tha t  as a policy 
issue, hazarcious waste cannot be managed by an approach based on conven- 
tional notions of 'decision making under uncertainty' alone. In risk issues this 
approach tends to locate the origins of uncertainty only in biophysical reality 
[26]. More technical analysis, and decision-insurance against any in t rac tab l e  
biophysical imprecision, is thus the conventional way to solutions.' Our con- 
clusion is that  the central properties of hazardous waste management make 
inst i tutionally generated uncertainties the dominant hnd .  These uncertainties 
include: tacit  social conflicts or dislocations over the problem being addressed; 
over the key terms used for defining the problem and satisfactory management 
mechanisms; and the key data. The first has already been tackled, so we now 
address the last two aspects. 
(a) Data Uncertainties 
Even if the  definitions of "hazardous" and "waste" were universally agreed, 
and there were also no intermediate interests diffracting "real" quantities and 
kinds of waste arisings into regulatory data, there would still  be more problems 
than often recognized, simply in making the "correct" technical observation. 
There was a t reatment  and disposal company in the UK which had been criti- 
cized for not controlling the composition of the wastes delivered to  it. The 
company contracted experts a t  Harwell to help devise an accurate analytical 
sampling device for just one of its many consignments, an oil-water emulsion 
delivered in 4,000 gallon tankers [ 2 7 ] .  A standard vertically sectioned thief- 
tube was recommended. Trials found even this simple two-phase physical sam- 
pling impossible to perform except by very rough estimation. There were not 
two phases but four - water; sludge; oil; sludge, - with very indistinct boun- 
daries. Samples along the  tanker  (which was only baffled, not compartmental- 
ized) showed variations by *50%, though they should have been identical. This 
was the !east diEcult kind of s a m ~ l i n g  and analysis - a very simple, merely 
physical analysis with no chemical complications - yet it proved impossible to 
perform anywhere near accurately. This was also for only one load, of only one 
Obviously there are different goals and preferences entering into policy decisions and 
these are dealt with by the standard approaches. However the dominant framework as- 
sumes that a unitary factual basis can be found (even if this is probabilistic), from which 
those preferences can take off. 
type of consignment among many different sorts. I t  is not surprising in the  
light of such  realjties why even in the detailed data survey of waste arisings in 
Hungary (see case study), it was admitted tha t  experts frequently had to  resort  
to  estimation to  obtain figures a t  all. 
Determining the Amount of Hazardous Waste in Massachusetts 
Attempt 1 :  The GCA Stlldy. In 1976, t he  Division of Water Pollution Control 
of t he  Commonwealth of Massachusetts commissioned a study from an environ- 
mental  consulting firm, the  GCA Corporation to  "survey the quantities, t h e  geo- 
graphic distribution, and the  cur rent  practices of hazardous waste disposal in 
the  commonwealth" [29]. As a first step, to determine the  quantity of waste 
generated in t h e  s tate ,  GCA reviewed the Division's file containing the  permit 
applications and monthly reports from waste transporters licensed to  operate 
in Massachusetts. These reports were required under a Massachusetts law prior 
to  the  enactment  of t he  federal RCRA regulation. The reports were supposed to 
include monthly summaries of where transporters picked up a waste, where it 
was sent,  waste type, and methods of t rea tment  and disposal. However, GCA 
found their  information incomplete and difficult to  track or compile [30]. They 
decided therefore to conduct a telephone survey of a selected number  of firms. 
Some 446 plants responded to  their telephone requests for information con- 
cerning type of waste, amount generated per month,  etc. This information usu- 
ally represented t h e  "best guess" of the plant manager or the plant's environ- 
menta l  engineer. 
In order t o  yield statewide totals the waste figures reported by the  firms 
were simply extrapolated on the  basis of n u m b e r  of employees  in the  firms sur- 
veyed, compared to total number of employees in the industries state-wide. 
The firms surveyed represented 36Z of the State 's manufacturing employees. 
This procedure assumed a linear relationship between waste generated and 
number of employees in a particular firm which GCA admittedly had no evi- 
dence was correct. But they felt tha t  the estimates of waste so generated were 
good lower limits, "probably accurate to within a factor of two" [31]. With this 
methodology GCA estimated tha t  37.57 million gallons of waste were being pro- 
duced per year in the  s tate .  
A t t emp t  2: The New  England Regional Commis s ion  S tudy .  In 1979, the New 
England Regional Commission employed Arthur D. Little (ADL) consultants to 
develop estimates of hazardous waste generation for the six s ta te  New England 
Region [32]. ADL performed no new analyses, rather it used the data of previous 
s ta te  studies including the GCA Report in Massachusetts. Taking GCA's raw data 
and performing the same extrapolation based on waste generated per employee 
ratios, ADL estimated the total wast generated for Massachusetts in 1979 was 
49.2 million gallons. an increase over GCA's total of approximately 30%. presum- 
ably due to changes in employee statistics [33]. 
The difficulty in using waste per employee ratios for extrapolation is shown 
by the wide range of ratios ADL found in New England. 
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The report admitted tha t  
Waste gener a t ed  p e r  e m p l o y e e  p e r  y e a r  
"variations between the states a re  not  readily 
explained on the basis of industry differences" [34]. 
In addition to this estimate, ADL provided a "high sludge" estimate on the  
assumption tha t  introduction of planned waste water t reatment  programs 
would lead to an increase in hazardous waste generation. Figures from Connec- 
t icut,  which already had such a program were used t o  estimate "high sludge" 
amounts  for the other  states.  This amount  for Massachusetts was reported a s  
84.9 million gallons per year [35]. 
E s t i m a t e s  Become  Fhct. I t  was this crudely estimated range of generated 
hazardous waste, 49.2-84.9 million gallons per year, tha t  became t h e  official 
s t a t e  statistic for hazardous waste generation. I t  was published however in 
units of tons,  where 240 gallons were assumed to equal one English ton (based 
on the  density of water). These values were 200,000-350,000 tons of waste per  
year. Just looking a t  one assumption alone, sludge or  solid waste could be 
several t imes heavier than  water, leading to  tonnage  figures several times 
grea te r  than  the estimates. With little reference to their  uncertainties,  t he  
figures were used to argue for the  enactment  of a s ta te  hazardous waste control 
program modeled after RCRA. 
A t t emp t  3: D e p a r t m e n t  of ~ v i r o n m e n t a i  Management :  Obviously not  
satisfied with these at tempts  a t  estimating hazardous waste generation in t he  
s ta te ,  the Massachusetts Department of Environmental Management (DEM) 
decided in 1981 t o  do i ts  own survey [36]. They hired yet another  consulting 
firm, Urban Systems research and Engineering, to computerize and compile t he  
information contained in t h e  s tate 's  transporter reports ( the  same report 
rejected as  too incomplete by GCA). This study calculated 170,000 tons of 
hazardous waste being produced in t he  state.  In addition. DEM reviewed the  
EPA notification list of potential generators (compiled under RCRA) and an 
industrial directory in order to identify "potential" generators not reporting 
the i r  wastes. Interviews conducted on site and by phone, and reviews of out-of- 
s t a t e  manifest totals for waste from Massachusetts delivered to o ther  states,  
"revealed an additional 17,000 tons of hazardous nTaste not reflected in or 
totals." DEM's final estimate was 190,000 tons of hazardous waste per  year [3?]. 
DEM identified sources of errors  in this  estimate,  which were drawn from 
on-site interviews with 25 generators:  
1. Under reporting of waste from generators who appear i n  the t ran-  
sporter  reports. 
2. Actual generators  who did not file t ransporter  reports as  required by 
law. 
Finally, DEM admitted tha t  these figures "for the  first time generated by hard 
data" took no account of waste being illegally dumped, "by pouring it down 
sewers, incinerating i t  without approval ..., mixing i t  with conventional wastes, 
or using illegal disposal facilities." Quite honestly they concluded, " the extent  
of illegal disposal in Massachusetts is unknown" [38]. 
B o r n  a S ta t e  to t he  Nation.  This case shows tha t  estimates of hazardous 
waste generation, often presented a s  ha rd  facts, and used in developing policies 
for control a re  inherently "soft" numbers.  Even more sophisticated surveys a re  
usually based on information voluntarily submitted by generators who face 
large incentives t o  underreport the i r  wastes. Amounts of waste being illegally 
disposed of is simply unknown. 
The problems of a s ta te  trying to  determine such figures a r e  even more  
insurmountable on a national level. In August 1983, the preliminary resul ts  of 
a US national survey of hazardous waste generators conducted for the  EPA, 
again by a crnsulting firm, were released. This survey was again based on a 
telephone and  mail questionnaire of approximately 10,000 generators who had 
identified themselves to t he  EPA as generators  under  the RCRA regulations. 
However, only 20% of the  firms surveyed claimed to  have generated any waste in  
1901 a t  all! T h e  study concludes: 
The initial estimates are preliminary in nature and are subject to sta- 
tistical uncertainties. Nonetheless, the study suggests that  150 mil- 
lion metric tons of hazardous waste were generated across the US and 
its territories during 1981, in contrast to previous estimates of 40 mil- 
lion metric tons. [39] 
This is also in contrast to the 250 million metric tons that  the US Office of Tech- 
nology Assessment estimated by simply adding up state  estimates for the 50 
states and territories [50]. All the effort therefore has produced figures for 
regulation which vary by a factor of about six. 
In the end, one must  conclude that  federal and state regulatory resources 
would be better spent not subsidizing the environmental consulting firm indus- 
t ry to produce numbers which inevitably have spurious authority conferred 
upon them simply because they exist. The summary by Donovan of her experi- 
ence tracking fuel-wood consumption estimates in Himalayan deforestation 
could be applied directly to the hazardous waste issue [41]: 
"All too often, consultants have neglected to explain the methods used 
to arrive a t  their expert opinions ... some estimates have been boldly 
quoted and requoted, often without citation, in ever more respectable 
documents, until a very casually contrived estimate has become the 
basis for policy formation and program planning." 
(b) Institutional Diffraction of Key Data and Key Terms 
When the authorities began in 1945 to try to assemble data about people's 
precise exposure to the blast and radiation from the Japanese A-bombs, they 
relied upon self-reporting of people's location a t  the time, and calculated doses 
from this [42]. Many survivors apparently mis-reported themselves to have 
been out of town, because a strong social stigma had rapidly grown against 
associatiorl with having been radiated. Later, when free welfare services were 
offered to bomb survivors, many of those who had been away suddenly recalled 
that. they had after all been in town, and the figures for the exposed population 
expanded, with corresponding changes in risk-estimates. 
In some countries where production is centrally planned and fervently pur- 
sued, incentives such as bonuses are offered to plant managers and workers 
who reach or even exceed production targets. There is therefore a natural 
temptation to overrecord production levels. Systematic tendencies in this 
direction have been observed, involving large-scale, informal social coordina- 
tion to avoid detection [43]. In some cases even ent ire  factories have 
apparently been created for central regulatory 'data.' so as to bolster 'produc- 
tion' and bonuses. Ingenious supporting elaborations have been developed, 
such as massive routine wastage and breakages to explain why the extra pro- 
duction did not generate corresponding revenue. In another case, involving 
new equipment and funds for oil production [44]: 
"Reports submitted by the  Ministry in the 5-year period showed 
modernization proceeding according to schedule, and production 
figures barely short of plan indices. But an outside inspection in 1981 
revealed virtually no at tempt to introduce the  new methods. Report 
data had simply been invented. and there was a shortfall of millions of 
tons of oil. Equipment had been left to  rust  and be pilfered. Inspec- 
tors found that  thousands of barrels of imported reagents had been 
dumped beside railway tracks, thrown into abandoned river pits, and 
even encased in the foundations of railway embankments." 
I t  took five years for this "data-diffraction" to be detected, by which t ime 
responsibility and remedy were extremely difficult if not impossible. 
When the Hungarian public heal th authorities were conducting their sur- 
vey into hazardous waste generation, i t  was found that  agricultural stations, 
which were part of the agriculture inspectorate, had been unofficially storing 
disused pesticides for many yeas when they should have been declaring, prop- 
eriy treating and disposing of Lhem. The s t a ~ i o n s  were found to have been sys- 
tematically under-reporting their inventories so as to "mask" their  own 
inefficiency and negligence [45]. 
Reliable data about waste arisings - their types, properties, volumes, ori- 
gins, movements, etc. - a r e  regarded (along with a meaningful hazard- 
classification or listing of wastes) as  the main foundation of a hazardous waste 
regulatory scheme. Naturally, everyone expects such data  to  be fuzzy; indeed 
the  more familiar one is with the  practical realities the less one expects of such 
data. When the  Environmental Safety Group of Harwell, UK gave evidence to  the 
Gregson Committee Inquiry of the  House of Lords, they gave a range of 2.5 to 4 
million tons of estimated hazardous wastes arisings per year in t he  UK. Discus- 
sion with the Committee expanded the  range t o  6.6 million tonnes. From their  
experience of the issue, and  having conducted surveys, they thought  this range 
pretty narrow. The Gregson Committee, which contained some experienced 
environmental policy makers,  but  no hazardous waste specialists was horrified 
tha t  regulation should have to  proceed in the face of such great  uncertainty as  
reflected in the  range of estimates [46]. 
The point about t he  examples above however, is not so much t h e  range of 
uncertainty, a s  if merely t h a t  about a piece of reality which is physically 
difficult t o  observe, bu t  the fact tha t  the observation itself is inevitably medi- 
a ted by other social actors. Sitting between the  observer and  the reality he 
wishes to observe these actors,  actively and  systematically diffract t he  observa- 
tion, because they have different (even themselves changing in t he  A-bomb sur- 
vivors' case) interests which give the  observations meaning and  clothe them as 
'facts' or 'data.' They a r e  data  and uncertainties, created by achvely strategiz- 
ing  agents; even when the  strategy is not  to deceive a regulator or  researcher,  
the  diffraction will still occur,  for other  reasons. 
Thompson and Yarburton gi:-e a similar esxnple of canqicting data on 
fuel-wood consumption ra tes  from research on Himalayan deforestation. The 
range of estimates of the  same factor, like hazardous waste arisings apparently 
crucial in regulation, differ by a s  much as  up t o  70 t imes [47]. Such variations 
do not only fog, they obliterate t he  'cliscoverable' differences between factual 
effects of policy options on which normal policy making subsists. Although in 
principle the  key quantity should be objectively measurable without mediation 
( there .is a given amount  of fuel-wood being c u t  down: there  were a given 
number  of survivors in different exposure categories in Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki), in practice it is not and never could be. One might alternatively say 
tha t  we can find people's diffracting orientation and their  "diffraction 
coefficients," and adjust reported facts accordingly to arrive a t  the 'real' facts. 
But this again is unrealistic in real situations. 
The same kind of actively-created uncertainty defines the central data in 
the hazardous waste management  issue. In this case however, the problem has 
a fur ther  wicked twist to it. 
For hazardous'wastes, not only is there diffraction caused by observation 
and reporting, but t he re  is an even deeper uncertainties over what is being 
observed anyway. Different basic definitions of what is "hazardous," and what is 
"waste" a re  also held by different actors in the  system, and by different regula- 
tory bodies in different s tate  or  national systems. Different definitions of key 
terms,  "hazardous" and "waste" sharply affect estimated volumes of hazardous 
waste arisings, even before one takes into account more deliberate diffraction. 
In this case, even the  underlying 'solid reality' becomes a mosaic subject to  
social definition. 
The context-dependent character  of "hazard" was discussed earlier in this 
chapter,  and  we will also re turn  to a different aspect of i ts context-dependence 
in Chapter Three. Let us now therefore look o ~ l y  at "waste." A very common 
and serious ambiguity lies in the storage or even sale of toxic waste against 
possible future recovery of constituents,  when i t  could be defined as a (non- 
regulable) resou.rce. For example, a litre of silver- or  mercury-contaminated 
oil or  sol.vent may be a (hazardous) waste if taken as such. But if chosen to be 
defined a s  one of a thousand different litres, to  be collected and combined, it 
may legitimately be an unregulated resource. Speculation against future 
market  prices of contaminants is another large loophole. 
An intriguing, but important case of this anomaly occurs when tankers or 
drums for liquid energy gas are "emptied." Because they are no longer carry- 
ing their usual load, they are treated as containing nothing, so they are taken 
as  non-hazardous. In fact they now contain a hazardous waste - gas vapow a t  
ambient pressure. Many accidents have occurred because of this perceptual 
anomaly*. 
The silt which is carried naturally down t h e  Rhine and deposited as a great 
economic nuisance in Rotterdam harbor used to be converted into a resource 
by dredging it and spreading i t  on agricultural land, where its high organic con- 
tent  was a benefit [48]. In lat ter  years, t h e  toxic contamination of the Rhine 
has  made this silt a hazardous waste, .useless for agricultural land, and 
disqualified from (human). sea-dumping by the  London-Oslo Conventions. 
Notice tha t  if the  mine had dumped i t  in the  North Sea tha t  would not have 
been disqualified! However the imaginative Dutch have turned  it back into a 
resource by using i t  to  landfill a new sea-dyke and suitably insulated, to create  
new residential or industrial land. The extensive Dutch civil engineering, 
dyke-building infrastructure is busy. The material concerned has remained 
t rue  to itself, but  has had various t ru ths  invested in i t  by the surrounding insti- 
tutions and actors  strategizing over it. 
A conference on risk assessment of hzzardous materials t r anqor t ,  University of Water;oo 
Institute of Risk Reseuch, Ontuis, Cacada, Ape! 1984, recorded this problem. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Regulation is the crucial system point where universal principles and ideal 
type methods and concepts embodied in science and political rhetoric must be 
converted in real effects, grappling with real organisational and physical con- 
straints and contradictions [49]. Science and risk assessment are one of its few 
valued resources in making policies, and making them credible. In the field of 
risk assessment of chemicals, scientific uncertainty itself is for the moment 
being relentlessly expanded by institutional driving-forces, in comparison to  
the escalating tasks demanded of i t  [50]. 
The dominant model of science in policy and risk management portrays a 
given pool of facts defocussed by surrounding uncertainty, which stands as a 
"feasibility space" for credible conflicting technical views of risks, etc. [53.]. 
More objective analysis or disciplined debate (or both), so this model goes, will 
tighten the  constraints of reality, and thus diminish the  fuzzy outline of this 
feasibility space a t  least towards a singular technical reality within which all 
policy options must be located. 
The present chapter used examples from technological risk analysis to  
show that  intrinsically different definitions of the relevant problem-system can 
always exist. (This does not mean that  m y  definition can be made up.) I t  
showed that the "feasibility space" of technical uncertainty may be being 
actively drawn in on some sides by some social groups, but actively pushed out 
on other sides. Other groups may be attempting to do the same, but with a 
different profile of contraction and expansion. Each is trying to defend enough 
technical uncertainty, in the  right areas, to make a viable association between 
a not incredible technical justification and its bundle of institutional interests 
or values. 
These profiles and processes a r e  not arbitrary, nor a re  they fully and deli- 
berately chosen. They are  strongly determined by pre-established institutional 
factors. Social analysis of science has corroborated this view of uncertainty 
and cognitive conflict [ 5 2 ] .  When a new area of "uncertainty" is identified, such 
as  chronic toxic chemicals effects, the  different entrants  bring with them their  
different conceptual and methodological resources already shaped by previous 
problem-definitions. explanatory interests,  and research traditions. These 
scientific positions evolve in different ways through the  unfolding policy issue 
so tha t  a t  any one time what is regarded as  known and what problematic by 
each school of thought is already shaped by these previous institutionalized 
(social and  cognitive) commitments.  In the  chlorofluorocarbons-ozone dispute 
for example, the  US government supported at tempts  to  develop one- 
dimensional models, which would create  data  tha t  could be compared between 
studies and thus  (i t  was hoped) create  a consensus. British approaches were 
dominated by two-dimensional models - with correspondingly different profiles 
of observation, key variables and uncertainties - because there  was less anx- 
iety abut policy consensus. As Rip has summarized i t  [33]: 
... this way of looking a t  the  socio-cognitive dynamics of a controversy 
makes it impossible to speak of areas of uncertainty tha t  leave room 
for different interpretations which a re  guided by the differing values 
and  interests  of the  parties in  the controversy. These values and  
interests have already been a t  work, through problem definitions and 
research agendas, in determining what the  lie of the land will be. And 
the  controversy is often not  about the interpretation of a given area of 
uncertainty, but about which areas a re  to be considered cer tain and 
which areas  of uncertainty a r e  sufficiently irrelevant to remain uncer-  
tain. 
Thus, i t  becomes vacuous to  suggest tha t  inere wouid be no contrc- 
versy if there  were no uncertainty. But this.  does seem t o  be an 
assumption in cur ren t  controversy studies: because there is a space 
left open by uncertainty, "controversies over science and technology 
develop over competing political, economic, or ethical values." (Nel- 
kin, 1979) This might be the case in NIMBY-type conflicts, where peo- 
ple do not want a new plant, a powerline. or some other technological 
project "in their  backyard." Even then,  however, socio-cognitive 
dynamics appear as  soon as the  assessment of hazards and other  
science-related aspects of decision making a re  drawn into the debate 
and subjected to fur ther  negotiation and articulation. 
This is a radically different concept of policy uncertainties,  technologies, 
risk problems, and of t he  role of risk assessment methods. The implied focus of 
analytical interest  shifts from technical uncertainties towards the  institutional 
patterns generating those technical uncertainties and their associated 
problem-definitions. 
The underlying focus of policy concern shifts partially (though not wholly) 
away from the  resolution of technical uncertainties towards building contexts 
of constructive negotiation and interaction between contending problem- 
definitions and institutional interests. This opens the  door on issues of institu- 
tional design and processes of justification. Bringing this chapter home to our 
present policy topic, hazardous wastes and toxic chemicals risk management 
generally are  much more ill-defined, technically and socially heterogeneous 
policy problems than the  technological systems analyzed in this chapter. Yet 
even the  lat ter  were shown to be pervaded by multiple problem definitions, even 
amongst experts. The significance of 'actively-strategized' uncertainties and 
their institutional origins and patterns has to be central  in policy analysis, a s  a 
context for viable risk assessment and  regulation. 
This is t r u e  for t he  internal nature of national systems. These internal 
institutional processes also shape the constraints upon harmonization a t  an 
international level. 
As will be discussed in the  final chapter,  these kinds of s t ructural ,  institu- 
tional uncertainty a re  not easy to articulate into public recognition and policy 
language. But their lack of recognition may exacerbate public reactions, and 
undermine regulatory credibility and the  viability of management ,  because this 
field exhibits more than most those features of inherent  heterogeneity, multi- 
ple problem definition and structural,  institutional uncertainty, which 
contradict dominant approaches. 
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